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Abstract
Euro-area accession caused boom-bust cycles in several catching-up economies. Declining in-
terest rates and easier ﬁnancing conditions fuelled spending and worsened the current account
balance. Over time inﬂation deteriorated external competitiveness and lowered domestic de-
mand, turning the boom into a bust. We ask whether such a scenario can be avoided using
macroeconomic tools that are available in the period of joining a monetary union: central parity
revaluation, ﬁscal tightening or increased taxation. While all these policies can be used to cool
down the output boom, exchange rate revaluation seems the most attractive option. It simul-
taneously trims the expansion of output and domestic demand, reduces the cost pressure and
ranks ﬁrst in terms of welfare.
JEL: E52, E58, E63
Keywords: boom-bust cycles, euro area accession, dynamic general equilibrium models5
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Non-technical summary
Several countries witnessed a boom-bust cycle during their euro area accession. This pattern was
particularly pronounced in relatively poor, catching-up economies, where nominal and real interest
rates were relatively high before the monetary integration. One of the crucial features of a currency
union is equalization of short-term interest rates as these are determined by the (now single) central
bank. This means a substantial reduction of these rates in high-growth economies. Medium and
long-term interest rates (e.g. on government bonds) need not be equal across the monetary union
members. Nevertheless, in practice, they also tend to adjust substantially, the main reasons being
elimination of the exchange rate risk and increased credibility. Moreover, for a small economy,
entering a monetary union means accessing an almost inexhaustible pool of funds, which facilitates
ﬁnancing borrowing needs. Finally, joining the club of more developed economies may be (rightly
or wrongly) perceived as a permanent boost to productivity. All these developments induce agents
to increase spending. As a result, the economy enters a boom phase, characterised by expansion of
consumption, investment and credit.
No boom lasts forever though and several mechanisms give an end to such one as well. First,
higher demand raises the domestic price level. This lowers the purchasing power of agents and
hence contributes to a fall in demand. Second, higher prices bring about an appreciation of the
real exchange rate, deteriorating competitiveness of exports. Last but not least, growing external
debt raises the risk perceived by foreign investors, increasing risk premia and, as a result, interest
rates (except the short-term central bank rate). Consequently, consumption, investment and exports
decline and the boom turns into bust.
This mechanism has been extensively described in the literature. In this paper we ask whether
such a boom can be prevented using tools that remain available to policymakers in the process of
euro adoption and thereafter. We concentrate our attention on Poland, by far the biggest new EU
member country which is supposed to join the euro area in the future. At the same time, its GDP
per capita is substantially below the euro area average and its interest rates are still much higher
than in the euro area. As such, Poland is a model example of a potential boom-bust cycle victim.
However, the analysis presented in this paper also applies to other new EU member states.
Our simulations are based on EAGLE, a four-region model developed by Gomes et al. (2010).
Before doing them, however, we substantially modify the model and its calibration. First, the model
is extended to allow for a non-zero import content of exports, which is a highly relevant feature for
the new EU member states. Second, we incorporate public goods into households’ utility function,
which allows us to perform meaningful welfare comparisons across alternative ﬁscal policies. Third,
the calibration of the model is changed so that it now includes Poland, the euro area, the United
States and the rest of the world.
Having done this, we ﬁrst generate the boom-bust scenario. A credibility shift, consisting of a
lower accepted net foreign asset position and the resulting decline of interest rates generates a tem-
porary boom that resembles the episodes described above. Next, we design four policy experiments
that are supposed to trim the boom-bust cycle. First, we consider a revaluation of the exchange
rate, a policy tool that is available only before joining the euro area. Second, we analyse the eﬀects
of increasing two tax rates: VAT and PIT. Finally, we experiment with cuts in government expendi-6
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tures. To make our scenarios more realistic, we impose implementability constraints on all policies
considered, i.e. we do not allow for repeated revaluations or changes in the ﬁscal parameters.
We ﬁnd that all considered policies are able to substantially smooth the boom in output. However,
they have diﬀerentiated eﬀects on other macro variables, some of them being undesired. For example,
ﬁscal contraction fuels the consumption boom, and a higher PIT rate increases inﬂation. From this
point of view, the exchange rate revaluation cuts oﬀ relatively well, cooling down the output and
inﬂation boom and substantially limiting booms in consumption and investment. Of course, this
comes at a cost of somewhat increased volatility of exports.
Revaluation is also the preferred policy according to the welfare criterion. Importantly, its
optimal magnitude coincides with that minimizing volatility of the output gap. This is in contrast
to the other policies, for which the welfare analysis suggests a signiﬁcantly lower size of intervention
than that implied by the output gap criterion, or even no action at all.
Looking at the instrument adjustment minimizing output gap volatility, we ﬁnd that the revalu-
ation should amount to ca. 7%, VAT rate should be raised by 9 percentage points, the PIT rate by
12 percentage points and the ﬁscal contraction should amount to around 2% of GDP. Thus, from the
political perspective, the analysed tax policies seem impossible to implement. On the other hand,
both the exchange rate revaluation and ﬁscal contraction seem to be of reasonable magnitudes. Ta-
king all these considerations together we conclude that revaluation is the most promising tool in
smoothing out the boom-bust cycle.7
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1 Introduction
Several countries witnessed a boom-bust cycle during their euro area accession. This pattern was
particularly pronounced in relatively poor, catching-up economies, where nominal and real interest
rates were relatively high before the monetary integration. One of the crucial features of a currency
union is equalization of short-term interest rates as these are determined by the (now single) central
bank. This means a substantial reduction of these rates in high-growth economies. Medium and
long-term interest rates (e.g. on government bonds) need not be equal across the monetary union
members. Nevertheless, in practice, they also tend to adjust substantially, the main reasons being
elimination of the exchange rate risk and increased credibility. Moreover, for a small economy,
entering a monetary union means accessing an almost inexhaustible pool of funds, which facilitates
ﬁnancing borrowing needs. Finally, joining the club of more developed economies may be (rightly
or wrongly) perceived as a permanent boost to productivity. All these developments induce agents
to increase spending. As a result, the economy enters a boom phase, characterised by expansion of
consumption, investment and credit.
No boom lasts forever though and several mechanisms give an end to such one as well. First,
higher demand raises the domestic price level. This lowers the purchasing power of agents and
hence contributes to a fall in demand. Second, higher prices bring about an appreciation of the
real exchange rate, deteriorating competitiveness of exports. Last but not least, growing external
debt raises the risk perceived by foreign investors, increasing risk premia and, as a result, interest
rates (except the short-term central bank rate). Consequently, consumption, investment and exports
decline and the boom turns into bust. Behaviour of the main macroeconomic variables of rich and
catching-up euro area members in the period neighbouring their accession is presented in ﬁgure 1.1
Clearly, the second group of economies experienced a substantial decrease in the real interest rates,
appreciation of the real exchange rate, expansion in output and domestic demand, and deterioration
in the external position.
This mechanism has been extensively described in the literature. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002)
presented a model which explained the diverging patterns of current account deﬁcits in a monetary
union. They show that a common currency oﬀers an opportunity to break the high correlation
between domestic savings and investment, known as the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, allowing lower
income economies to borrow more to increase their capital stock. ECB (2003) identiﬁed the reasons of
inﬂation divergence in the monetary union and listed convergence of the nominal interest rates as one
of the main factors.2 Other papers were even more explicit about boom-bust cycles. Brzoza-Brzezina
(2005) and Schadler et al. (2005) analysed the risk of lending booms during euro area accession of
the new EU member states. Fagan and Gaspar (2007) documented the diverging patterns of main
macroeconomic variables (i.a. real interest rates, consumption, lending and current account balances)
between the core and converging countries of the euro area. They presented a general equilibrium
framework based on Blanchard-Yari households that replicates the main features of the boom-bust
scenario described above. Blanchard (2007) and Almeida et al. (2009) analysed the case of Portugal
1These results are based not only on the experience of the oﬃcial euro area members, but also of three new EU
member countries that follow hard pegs against the euro: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As described below, these
countries witnessed similar boom-bust episodes in the period neighbouring pegging their currencies to the euro.
2The large literature on inﬂation divergence in the euro area is also closely related to the topic of boom-bust cycles
(Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2004; Honohan and Lane, 2003; L´ opez-Salido et al., 2005; Zd´ arek and Aldasoro, 2009).8
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and ascribed its boom-bust pattern to the drop in interest rates related to the euro area accession,
while Honohan and Leddin (2006) documented similar developments in Ireland. Eichengreen and
Steiner (2008) analysed the potential of Poland to become a victim of the boom-bust scenario during
the euro adoption. They found that several features (relatively high interest rates, low credit to GDP
ratio) place Poland on the list of potentially endangered countries. As mentioned above, the list of
countries already aﬀected by a boom-bust scenario is not restricted to oﬃcial euro area members.
Several new EU member states pegged their currencies to the euro. In particular, the three Baltic
countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) experienced a dramatic overheating in the mid 2000s,
with low interest rates imported from the euro area being one of the potential culprits (Brixiova et
al., 2009; Kuodis and Ramanauskas, 2009). All in all, there is plenty of evidence that the euro area
accession of catching-up economies might end up in unsustainable booms.
In this paper we ask whether such a boom in domestic demand can be prevented using tools that
remain available to policymakers in the process of euro adoption and thereafter. We concentrate our
attention on Poland, by far the biggest new EU member country which is supposed to join the euro
area in the future. At the same time (in 2010, as this paper is being written), its GDP per capita
amounts to approximately 60% of the euro area average and its interest rates are still substantially
higher than in the euro area. As such, Poland is a model example of a potential boom-bust cycle
victim. However, the analysis presented in this paper also applies to other new EU member states.
Our simulations are based on EAGLE, a multicountry model developed by Gomes et al. (2010).
Before doing them, however, we substantially modify the model and its calibration. First, the model
is extended to allow for a non-zero import content of exports. This feature, being relatively less
important in the original setting of EAGLE, calibrated for Germany, the rest of the Euro Area, the
United States and the rest of the world, is highly relevant for the new EU member states, where the
import content of exports is relatively high. Second, we incorporate public goods into households’
utility function, which allows us to perform meaningful welfare comparisons across alternative ﬁscal
policies. Third, the calibration of the model is changed so that it now includes Poland, the euro
area, the United States and the rest of the world.
After extending and recalibrating the model we design a series of simulations. Our baseline
scenario consists of declining interest rates, driven by a boost to acceding country’s borrowing op-
portunities, under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. This generates a boom, under which output expands
by nearly 2.5% above the steady state, consumption grows by 5% and investment by above 12%. As
a consequence, inﬂation increases, the real exchange rate appreciates and, after approximately two
years, the boom turns into bust. We design four policy experiments that are supposed to trim the
boom-bust cycle. First, we consider a revaluation of the exchange rate, a policy tool that is available
only before joining the euro area. Second, we analyse the eﬀects of increasing two tax rates: VAT
and PIT. Finally, we experiment with cuts in government expenditures. To make our scenarios more
realistic, we impose implementability constraints on all policies considered, i.e. we do not allow for
repeated revaluations or changes in the ﬁscal parameters.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, all considered policies are able to substantially smooth
the output boom. Second, the alternative policy interventions have diﬀerentiated eﬀects on other
macro variables. In particular, ﬁscal contraction adds even more to the consumption boom, while
other policies succeed in smoothing it. A higher PIT rate increases inﬂation, while the exchange rate9
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revaluation smoothes the boom in consumer prices almost perfectly. Only these two policies lower
the boom in investment. Overall, in this category, the exchange rate revaluation cuts oﬀ relatively
well. Third, this policy ranks ﬁrst when the model-consistent welfare criterion is applied.
When comparing the size of instrument adjustment minimising the output gap volatility, we ﬁnd
that the optimal revaluation amounts to ca. 7%, the VAT rate should be raised by 9 percentage
points, the PIT rate by 12 percentage points and ﬁscal contraction should amount to around 2% of
GDP. Thus, the analysed tax policies are not only relatively ineﬃcient in smoothing the output boom,
but also very diﬃcult to implement from the political perspective. On the other hand, the ﬁscal
contraction, and even more the exchange rate revaluation seem to be of acceptable magnitudes. Given
these considerations, together with the results of the welfare analysis and the undesirable property
of spending cuts which increase the consumption boom, we ﬁnd the exchange rate revaluation the
most promising tool in smoothing out the boom-bust cycle.
Having said this, one thing should be made explicit. In this paper we deal with the risk of a
boom-bust cycle in domestic demand. One important issue that this study does not take into account
is the possible emergence and bursting of asset price bubbles. EAGLE has a well developed structure
of production, international linkages and government policies, which seem important when analysing
issues related to the monetary union accession, exchange rate movements and policy intervention.
However, this comes at a cost, being the model size. It seems hardly possible to extend such a
model for the existence of asset price bubbles and regulatory policies. Second, we doubt whether
policies available to the local authorities are able to stop an asset price bubble from emerging, due
to potential regulatory arbitrage. Nevertheless, we believe that this is an important and interesting
topic for further research.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section two we present the model, its calibration
and the main business cycle properties. Section three discusses our baseline boom-bust scenario.
Section four describes how we deﬁne and design the optimal policy interventions. The scenarios
implied by these policies are presented in section ﬁve and evaluated in section six. Section seven
concludes the paper and the appendix presents the details of the model extension.
2 The model
2.1 EAGLE and its extension
The EAGLE (Euro Area and GLobal Economy) model is a four-country dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model of the euro area in a global economy. It includes Germany, the rest of
the euro area (which are both in a monetary union), the US and the rest of the world. EAGLE,
based on the NAWM (Coenen et al., 2008b), is also in the vein of the other international models
such as GEM (Bayoumi et al., 2004) or SIGMA (Erceg et al., 2006). Thus, the new open economy
macroeconomics paradigm constitutes its theoretical background. All country-bloc speciﬁcations are
identical.
Households are inﬁnitely lived, consume ﬁnal goods and supply labour to all ﬁrms in a monopo-
listic manner. Wages are sticky ` a la Calvo with an indexation scheme. Households are distinguished
according to their ability to access the ﬁnancial market. Non-Ricardian agents that do not have10
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this facility can only ﬁnance their consumption through labour income. At the opposite, Ricardian
agents own domestic ﬁrms, rent the physical capital to them, and can buy or sell bonds: a govern-
ment bond or a bond denominated in US dollars. The internationally traded bond is subject to
transaction costs, meaning that households pay a premium to ﬁnancial intermediaries. There are
also adjustment costs on physical capital accumulation. Both capital and labour are internationally
immobile.
On the supply side, there are two types of ﬁrms. Firms producing ﬁnal goods for consumption or
investment purposes use a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology assembling domestic
intermediate goods and imports (that are subject to adjustment costs) and act under perfect compe-
tition. Firms producing intermediate goods operate under monopolistic competition. Intermediate
goods can either be internationally traded (tradable sector) or not (non-tradable sector). Both
sectors use a Cobb-Douglas production function combining domestic capital and domestic labour.
Exporting ﬁrms set prices in the currency of the destination market (local currency pricing) to limit
the exchange rate pass-through. Finally, staggered contracts ` a la Calvo (with indexation) introduce
sluggishness in price adjustment.
The government purchases a public good (non-tradable only) and ﬁnances its expenditure by
issuing bonds and levying taxes. These taxes can either be lump-sum or distortionary, with the
latter based on consumption purchases, labour, capital or dividend incomes. Fiscal authorities make
transfers to households and earn seigniorage on outstanding money holdings. The ﬁscal rule sets the
lump-sum tax by targeting the debt-to-GDP ratio. Monetary authorities ﬁx the short-term nominal
interest rates with a Taylor rule.
The original structure of the model has been amended to better ﬁt the Polish economy. In
particular, the Polish economy features a much higher import content of exports than for instance
the euro area or the United States. This feature can be important while running simulations in
which international linkages play an important role. For this reason we extend the model for the
import content of exports. Following Coenen and Vetlov (2009), we introduce a new type of good, i.e.
the export good, which consists of domestic tradables and imported goods. This good is produced
under monopolistic competition and priced in the currency of the destination market. Details of the
derivation are given in the Appendix.
Another important modiﬁcation of the original structure of EAGLE is related to our use of
welfare as one of the criteria for evaluation of alternative policy interventions. It is standard in the
DSGE literature to include government purchases neither in households’ utility nor ﬁrms’ production
function. With such an assumption, however, public expenditures are wasteful and hence welfare can
be increased by driving them to zero. To eliminate such corner prescriptions in our welfare analysis,
we interpret government spending as provision of public goods and modify the utility function of
each household type accordingly. Our aim is to make this modiﬁcation as natural and neutral as
possible. More speciﬁcally, the ﬂow of government goods is assumed to be equally distributed (in
per capita terms) across Ricardian and non-Ricardian households. Further, we assume that utility
is separable in private consumption and public goods so that no ﬁrst order conditions of households’
optimization are aﬀected by our modiﬁcation. We also use the same functional forms for the utility
components related to both types of goods. Finally, we follow Adam and Billi (2008) and calibrate
the relative weight on the utility component including government spending such that for each11
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type of households the steady state marginal utility of public goods provision and private goods
consumption are equalized.
2.2 Calibration
As already mentioned, we are interested in examining the impact of euro area accession on a co-
nverging economy, and hence calibrate the model to Poland (PL), the euro area (EA), the United
States (US) and the rest of the world (RW). Our strategy to calibrate EAGLE can be divided into
two stages. First, we pin down a subset of parameters governing some key steady-state ratios,
using their approximate empirical counterparts. Next, we calibrate the remaining parameters of
the model, drawing heavily on the original version of EAGLE, which in turn can be traced back to
the parametrisation of the NAWM or GEM, as well as estimated small scale DSGE models for the
euro area (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003; Adolfson et al., 2005; Christoﬀel et al., 2008), the United
States (e.g. Christiano et al., 2005) and Poland (Grabek et al., 2010; Kolasa, 2009; Gradzewicz and
Makarski, 2009). The calibrated parameters are reported in Tables1-7 .B e l o ww ep r o v i d eab r i e f
discussion on our main choices and data sources.
Steady-state ratios
The relative size of each region is calibrated to reﬂect its GDP share in the world economy. Consi-
stently with the assumption that each region’s steady-state trade balance is zero, we set the nominal
output shares of consumption, government expenditures and investment to the respective domestic
demand shares of private consumption, government consumption and gross capital formation. All
this data corresponds to the averages for the period 1995-2008 and comes from the national accounts
statistics collected in the Eurostat and World Development Indicators databases.
To obtain a more recent picture of international trade relations, we set the total import share
of each region using the same data source, but averaged over a shorter sample (2004-2008). The
structure of bilateral trade ﬂows, including their ﬁnal use breakdown (consumption, investment or
intermediate), relies on ﬂows of goods extracted from the CHELEM database and averaged over the
years 2004-2008. The exception is Poland, for which we were able to collect data on bilateral trade
in both goods and services provided by the National Bank of Poland. It is worth noting that more
than half of Poland’s imports of any type of goods come from the euro area.
The shares of domestic tradables in production of the export good (i.e. one minus the import
content of exports) were set to 80% for the EA, 85% for the US, 55% for PL and 65% for the RW. For
the former three regions this is consistent with estimates from the input/output matrices, while for
the RW it is based on the proportion of intermediate goods imports to total exports (no input/output
matrix is available). The quasi-shares of nontradables in the consumption and investment baskets are
set to 75% and 35%, respectively, which together with the assumption of fully nontradable content of
government expenditures implies the share of tradable output in GDP of about 35%. This number
is roughly consistent with the values implied by the share of agriculture, mining and manufacturing
in the total market economy, calculated for Poland, the euro area and the United States for the
period 1995-2008 using the EU-KLEMS database.12
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Other parameters
We set the capital share in production functions in all countries to 30%. The tax structure for the
euro area and the United States is taken directly from Gomes et al. (2010). The tax structure for
Poland comes from national sources and tax wedges for the rest of the world are calibrated at the
US level. The capital tax rate is treated as a free parameter and used to calibrate the region-speciﬁc
investment shares in output. Price and wage mark-ups for the euro area, the United States and the
rest of the world are in most cases left at the original levels, while the numbers for Poland are set
at the EA level. These values imply lower competition in Poland and in the euro area region than
in the rest of the global economy, both on the labour and the product market. At the same time we
assume that markets for tradables are more competitive than for nontradables in all countries.
Most of the remaining key parameters are assumed to be the same across the four regions and
broadly consistent with the original version of EAGLE or the calibrated version of NAWM. Calvo
probabilities on the labour and domestic product markets are set to 0.75, implying an average time
between wage and price reoptimisation of four quarters. Indexation parameters are set to 0.5 on the
product market and 0.75 on the labour market. The elasticities of substitution used for aggregating
various bundles of goods into ﬁnal consumption goods are the same as those for ﬁnal investment
goods. In particular, the elasticity of substitution between nontradable goods and a bundle of
domestic tradable and imported goods is set to 0.5, the elasticity of substitution between home-
made and imported tradable baskets is calibrated at 2.5. The elasticity of substitution between
domestic and imported goods in the production of export goods is set at a somewhat lower level of
1.5 and the parameter governing substitutability across imports from diﬀerent countries is assumed
to be 2.5.
The choices of adjustment cost parameters are taken directly from the original versions of EAGLE
and NAWM as well. The response of the share of lump-sum taxes in nominal output to deviations
of the public debt-to-output ratio from the target (60% on an annual basis) is set to 0.1. Only the
parameter governing the international transaction cost (reaction of interest rates to net foreign assets
(NFA)) is set speciﬁcally for this paper in a way that allows meeting simultaneously the assumptions
on interest rates and NFA in our baseline scenario. This is explained in detail in section 3. We also
maintain the NAWM assumption on asymmetric distribution of lump sum transfers and taxes across
the two types of households, favouring those with limited access to capital markets in the proportion
of 3 to 1. Finally, the long-run monetary policy response to inﬂation and output growth is calibrated
at 1.7 and 1.25, respectively, while the weight on the lagged interest rate is set to 0.8.
Besides taking most parameters from the literature, we pay special attention to the short-term
dynamic responses of the Polish economy to various shocks. This is crucial, taking into account the
simulations to be performed. In particular, our goal was to bring the impulse response functions
close to those from the estimated DSGE models of the Polish economy (Grabek et al., 2010; Kolasa,
2009; Gradzewicz and Makarski, 2009). In order to match the impulse responses, we run the model
assuming independent monetary policy for Poland, as is currently the case. Given the calibration
presented above, this did not require substantial changes to the parameters, an exception being a
somewhat higher habit persistence parameter, helping to trim the volatility of consumption. The
impulse response functions are presented in the next section.13
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2.3 Business cycle properties
In this section we document the main business cycle properties of the recalibrated model. We
concentrate on the reaction of the Polish economy to a set of standard shocks.3 As mentioned in the
previous section, the calibration of several parameters was done so as to match the impulse responses
to those from estimated DSGE models under the assumption of independent monetary policy. On
the other hand, our boom-bust scenarios will be designed under the assumption of a ﬁxed exchange
rate against the euro. As a consequence, we present impulse responses under both monetary policy
regimes.
Our analysis begins with the reaction to a standard technology shock, aﬀecting to the same
degree productivity in the tradable and nontradable sectors. Figure 2 shows the reaction of the
main macroeconomic variables. The impulse responses are standard to a supply side shock. In
particular, real variables increase while inﬂation declines. Under independent monetary policy, the
central bank reacts to this by lowering interest rates. However, this reaction is muted since output
and inﬂation move in opposite directions. Under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, domestic interest
rates decline slightly as well due to improvement in the current account balance, the resulting lower
risk premium and spillovers to the euro area. Given the weak reaction of the domestic central bank
in the ﬂoat case, the economy reacts similarly under both exchange rate regimes.
Monetary policy shocks constitute a more interesting case (Figure 3). Since under the peg regime
domestic monetary policy does not control the short-term interest rates, in this case we present the
reaction to a shock to the euro area interest rate. This should be kept in mind since the euro area
interest rate aﬀects also the euro area economy and so has an additional, indirect impact on Poland.
In general, the shape of reaction functions is standard. Output, consumption and investment decline,
so does inﬂation. The magnitude of reactions of the main variables under independent monetary
policy is broadly consistent with that from other studies on the Polish economy. However, reactions
under the peg are somewhat weaker. The reason is the exchange rate channel, which is an important
component of the monetary transmission under the ﬂoat. After pegging to the euro, the appreciation
of the real eﬀective exchange rate is weaker and so is the reaction of most variables.
Figure 4 presents the impulse responses to a risk premium shock. The reaction under the ﬂoating
exchange rate comes primarily from the sharp depreciation of the exchange rate. As a result, exports
surge and imports decline, generating a surplus in the current account and giving a boost to GDP.
Following the exchange rate depreciation, inﬂation increases, which results in a monetary policy
tightening. This contributes to a drop of consumption and investment. As before, the magnitude of
reaction of the main variables is in line with other estimates for Poland. The transmission pattern
is diﬀerent under the peg. Since the possible exchange rate reaction is limited, the adjustment to
the higher risk premium takes place in the domestic interest rate. This has a negative impact on
consumption, investment, output and inﬂation. In particular, it is worth noting that the latter two
variables move in opposite directions compared to the independent monetary policy case.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the responses to a government expenditure shock. As in the case of the
technology shock, the reactions of most variables are similar under the ﬂoating and ﬂexible exchange
rate. This results from the relatively weak reaction of monetary policy. Output increases on impact
3For all shocks, the autoregressive coeﬃcient is 0.9 and the standard deviation is 1%.14
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and, taking into account the share of government expenditure in GDP, its response implies a ﬁscal
multiplier of approximately one. Higher government expenditure crowds out private consumption
and investment and brings about an appreciation of the real exchange rate. As a consequence, exports
decline and imports increase. It should be noted that in the current model setting the government
consumes only nontradable goods, so there is no direct impact of its spending on imports.
All in all, the reactions of the main variables to the presented shocks are in line with the literature
and their magnitude seems comparable to that found in empirically underpinned studies of the Polish
economy.
3 Permanent credibility shift
For a relatively poor economy, entering the euro area implies elimination of the exchange rate risk
and a boost to credibility. This translates into better access to ﬁnancial markets and a drop in
interest rates. All in all, for a given level of external debt, borrowing from abroad becomes cheaper.
We use these insights in designing our baseline boom scenario. More speciﬁcally, we assume that
joining the euro area by an emerging economy results in a permanent step decrease in its target
(long-run) level of NFA. In other words, the amount of foreign debt accepted by ﬁnancial market
participants, i.e. the level considered as safe, increases. Since, as usually assumed in contemporane-
ous open economy models with incomplete ﬁnancial markets, the interest rate paid on foreign loans
depends positively on the diﬀerence between the current and long-run external debt, such a scenario
leads to a drop in the cost of borrowing. It is important to note that this decrease in the interest
rates is only temporary: once indebtedness of the new entrant achieves the new steady state, the cost
of borrowing goes back to its initial level. We consider this feature of our scenario very attractive,
given the recent aversion of ﬁnancial markets to highly indebted peripheral euro area countries.
We calibrate Poland’s entry to the euro area as follows. First, we set the size of the shift in the
NFA position to 30% of annual GDP. This choice can be considered small as the average drop in this
ratio in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the eight years surrounding their
euro area accession(as presented in ﬁgure 1) amounted to almost 50%. However, we ﬁnd it reasonable
to assume that ﬁnancial markets will become more cautious after the recent balance of payments
tensions in some euro area countries and so less likely to tolerate as large increases in foreign debt as
experienced by the acceding countries in the past. Second, we calibrate the link between the interest
rate and the NFA position embeded in EAGLE so that it generates a drop in the acceding country’s
long-term interest rates of around 110 basis points, which corresponds to the historical (2005-2010)
diﬀerence between the yields on 10-year Polish government bonds denominated in Polish zlotys and
euro-denominated bonds of a similar maturity.4
The dynamic responses to the baseline boom scenario deﬁned above are presented in Figure
6. Lower interest rates make Ricardian households increase their spending, so consumption and
4In EAGLE, taking a position in the international bond market is subject to an intermediation premium Γt,
i.e. interest paid on foreign debt is equal to R∗
t(1 − Γt), where R∗
t is the (gross) risk-free return on foreign bonds.





t+1 − ¯ B∗ 
− 1
 
− rpt, where γB is the elasticity parameter (international
transaction costs in Table 7),B∗
t+1 denotes the NFA to GDP ratio, ¯ B∗ is its steady-state (target) level and rpt is a
risk premium shock. Our calibration sets γB such that the two assumptions underlying our baseline scenario (i.e. a
shift in the NFA position and a drop in the long-term interest rates) are simultaneously satisﬁed.15
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investment go up. Higher demand leads to an expansion in domestic output and imports, so the
current account balance deteriorates signiﬁcantly. The boom increases labour demand and improves
the ﬁscal balance, which allows the government following the ﬁscal rule to cut lump sum taxes. As
a result, income of non-Ricardian households improves and their spending grows. Increased cost
pressure pushes prices up. As the nominal exchange rate is ﬁxed and prices abroad hardly move,
the real exchange rate appreciates.
The adjustment of the NFA position to its new steady state value is gradual, with half of it
completed only in the seventh year after the euro adoption. As a result, the period of low interest
rates is quite long, so it takes more than ten years for the expansion in domestic demand to die out.
In contrast, the boom in output turns into bust already after approximately two years. The reason is
the deterioration in international competitiveness, resulting in a contraction in exports. Only after
the cost pressures decline somewhat and the competitiveness is restored do exports recover, which
together with declining imports leads to a second, but smaller in magnitude, expansion in output.
As Poland is a small country, the spillovers from the credibility shift in this economy to other
regions, even to the closely linked euro area, are very limited. Qualitatively, they will depend on
how the decrease in Poland’s long-run NFA position is absorbed abroad. In our baseline scenario,
we assume that the whole adjustment can be attributed to the euro area and hence the international
investment positions of the US and the rest of the world remain unchanged.5 As increased lending
to Poland is ﬁnanced with higher savings of the euro area, our scenario implies a small contraction
in the latter’s output.
Finally, it might be instructive to analyse the long-run implications of our baseline scenario. A
ﬁrst look at Table 8 makes clear that the boom sparked by a credibility shift is not a free lunch. Higher
external debt needs to be serviced, which requires the trade balance to be in surplus. This induces
a shift in production towards tradable output and a decrease in imports. The disposable income of
Ricardian households (i.e. those who run debt abroad) declines, so they cut their consumption and
investment expenditures, and increase their labour supply. As revenues from distortionary taxes go
down, lump sum taxes need to be increased to keep the public debt constant. This hits, though
proportionally less, also non-Ricardian consumers. All these demand shifts lead to equilibrium
changes in relative prices: terms of trade and the real exchange rate depreciate while the relative
price of tradables goes up.
4 Designing policies for the boom
The model we are using is not able to capture all channels making the boom-bust cycle harmful. In
particular, our baseline scenario is not a typical bubble, resulting from overly optimistic expectations.
Instead, it reﬂects dynamic responses of rational agents, subject to a set of constraints. Since the
model includes a range of nominal and real rigidities, appropriately designed stabilization policies
can be welfare improving. However, gains from applying them are known to be rather small in a
standard quantitative business cycle framework, at least when model-consistent evaluation criteria
are used (Lucas, 2003).
That said, one can list several reasons why smoothing the boom-bust cycle might be in practice
5This assumption does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the dynamic responses of Polish macroaggregates.16
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more justiﬁed than the welfare analysis suggests. The most important one is that temporary but
prolonged periods of prosperity can lead to excessive optimism, increasing the likelihood of bubbles
building up and making the necessary adjustment of imbalances sudden and painful. Moreover,
rapid expansions in output and consumption are usually accompanied by lending booms, which may
have detrimental eﬀects on the banking sector stability. Therefore, even though such eﬀects are not
incorporated in our workhorse model, it still might be relevant to analyse which policies are most
successful in smoothing the boom.
For a small economy, adopting the euro means in practice giving up monetary autonomy as short-
term interest rates are now set by the European Central Bank in response to area-wide developments.
The only monetary parameter that can be used (but only prior to accession) is revaluation of the
nominal exchange rate. In contrast, the new entrant can still use a full set of ﬁscal instruments. In
theory, one can design many revenue and expenditure policies smoothing the boom completely. In
practice, they would require changes of the ﬁscal instruments on a quarterly basis. While this might
be feasible for some types of expenditures, it is diﬃcult to imagine so frequent adjustments in such
parameters as the tax rates or major spending components.
Therefore, we restrict our attention to those policies that can be considered implementable. In
particular, we assume that the exchange rate can be revalued only once, and the tax rates can be
changed twice (i.e. up and back to the original level) for full-year periods. We make a similar
assumption for the government spending share in GDP, but additionally look at a variant allowing
it to be adjusted every period.
For the reasons discussed before, we parameterize and evaluate alternative policies using two
criteria. First, we consider a simple stabilization objective. While there are a number of economic
indicators that could be used as potential targets for a countercyclical policy, we use the most
natural one, i.e. the output gap volatility, deﬁned as the root mean square deviation of output from
its terminal steady state level and calculated over a 10-year horizon. Even though the focus on
output gap stabilization seems natural given the common practice, this choice might be considered
somewhat arbitrary. Therefore, we will also discuss the implications of the policies designed to
minimise output gap volatility for other variables.
Second, we apply the welfare criterion. This is not straightforward as the steady state equilibrium
in the model is not eﬃcient and so the constrained optimal policies we consider imply non-zero
interventions even if the credibility shift underlying our baseline scenario does not occur. Since we
want to net such eﬀects out, we proceed as follows. For each policy variant, we calculate the optimal
change of policy parameters with and without the boom and deﬁne the best response to the boom
from the welfare perspective as the diﬀerence between the two.17
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5 Policy simulations
5.1 Exchange rate revaluation
The ﬁrst policy scenario we consider relies on counteracting the boom with a one-oﬀ exchange rate
revaluation. One can think of this policy as resulting from an agreement between the new entrant
and the rest of the euro area to set the conversion rate at a stronger level than currently prevailing on
the foreign exchange market. Interestingly, the magnitude of the revaluation minimising the output
gap volatility roughly coincides with that implied by the welfare criterion and amounts to about
7%.6
The dynamic responses to this scenario are plotted in Figure 7. The exchange rate revaluation
turns out quite successful in cooling down the boom. Compared to the baseline, the initial swing in
output is dramatically reduced. This aﬀects households’ income, so the peak response of consumption
and investment is delayed and decreased substantially. The contraction in exports is slightly deeper
(by 0.7 percentage points) than under baseline so the current account deteriorates more, but only
in the short run. The revaluation has an important eﬀect on inﬂation, which is smoother and of
diﬀerent sign compared to the baseline. The stronger exchange rate increases price competitiveness
of imports from the euro area so the short-run response of its output is now positive, though still
very small.
5.2 VAT hike
We next analyse to what extent the boom can be smoothed with a temporary change in indirect
taxes. To this eﬀect, we search for the magnitude and duration of a VAT hike that minimises
volatility of the output gap.7 This turns out to be 9 percentage points for two years. On the other
hand, the optimal shift in the VAT rate from the welfare perspective, if also applied for a two-year
period, is twice lower and amounts to 4.5 percentage points.
We plot these two scenarios in Figure 8. A temporary increase in VAT aﬀects the intertemporal
substitution incentives, making households postpone their consumption decisions. As a result, the
short-run increase in consumption is nearly eliminated if the rate goes up by 9 percentage points and
substantially decreased if the change amounts 4.5 percentage points. However, in the former variant,
once the tax rate is restored to its initial value, consumption expenditures quickly take oﬀ and in the
medium run reach values exceeding those under the baseline. Given the smoothing motive implied
by households’ utility function, such swings in consumption are undesired and the welfare consistent
criterion takes this into account. Since any VAT hike makes the relative price of investment goods
cheaper, the boom in investment is magniﬁed. Overall, the VAT policy successfully weakens the
short run expansion in domestic demand, smoothing the boom in output and slightly decreasing the
pace of current account deterioration. Inﬂation pressure, measured with the consumer price index
at producer prices, is also reduced.8
6Since the parametrization of our policies is based on a grid search, the accuracy of our results is determined by
the size of the search step, which we set to 0.5 percentage points for all policies considered in this section.
7We search over a two-dimensional grid of 0.5 to 15 percentage points (size of hikes) and 1 to 4 years (duration).
The same grid is applied to the scenario based on PIT increases.
8Naturally, with a hike in VAT, market prices of consumption goods go up much more compared to the baseline
scenario.18
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5.3 PIT hike
If the government wants to minimise output volatility by changing personal income taxes levied on
labour income, it should increase the PIT rate by 12 percentage points for two years. In contrast,
the welfare analysis prescribes virtually the same magnitude of intervention with and without the
boom.
Figure 9 helps to understand this result. As can be seen, increasing the PIT rate is quite
eﬀective in stiﬂing domestic demand. In particular, it cools down the boom in both consumption
and investment. However, an increase in direct taxes decreases factor supply, hence ﬁrms’ costs
and inﬂation go up. This is costly in terms of welfare if prices are set in a staggered fashion. Also,
increased cost pressure erodes ﬁrms’ competitiveness. As a result, the real exchange rate appreciation
is stronger and exports fall by more than under the baseline. Finally, while a PIT hike helps to cut
the peak response of output, it also makes the subsequent bust larger.
5.4 Government spending cuts
If we apply similar implementation constraints to the government expenditure cuts as to the VAT
and PIT rate hikes discussed above, the policy yielding the lowest output gap volatility is a three
year reduction in public spending by around 2% of GDP.9 Again, the welfare maximizing size of
ﬁscal adjustment, also restricted to three years, is essentially zero.
We consider these scenarios in Figure 10. As government purchases aﬀect aggregate demand
directly, cutting them is quite successful in reducing the boom in output. However, the side eﬀect
of thus deﬁned ﬁscal consolidation, undesired from the welfare perspective, is magniﬁcation of the
consumption and investment booms. Cutting government expenditures also somewhat weakens the
cost pressure, so the responses of inﬂation, the real exchange rate and hence the current account
balance become smoother.
It can be argued that public spending is to a large extent at the discretion of the government
and so faces less severe implementation lags compared to changes in the tax rates. Therefore, one
can at least conceptually think of a policy that ﬁne-tunes the government purchases so that output
ﬂuctuations are eliminated completely. Such a policy is illustrated with dotted lines in Figure 10.
The required path of government expenditures (not shown) is roughly the rescaled mirror image
of the output response in our baseline scenario. The magnitude of short-term spending cuts is
substantial, reaching 20% (or around 3.5% of GDP) in the second year. The impact of this scenario
on other macrocategories is qualitatively similar to its restricted variant.10
5.5 Other policies
Besides the variants described above, we have also considered a range of other policies that might
be used to cool down the boom sparked by the euro adoption. These include changes in social
9We search over a two-dimensional grid of 0.5 to 5 percent of GDP (size of cuts) and 1 to 4 years (duration).
10The only important diﬀerence is that now the expansion in investment becomes weaker than under the baseline
without any intervention. This is because government spending consists of nontradables only, so a reduction in demand
for this type of goods results in a decrease in their relative price. As the nontradable content of investment is much
lower than that of consumption, the relative demand for the former will go down as long as the shift in relative prices
is expected not to be quickly reversed, which is the case in the variant fully stabilizing output.19
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security contributions, capital income taxes and the target public debt to GDP ratio. Overall,
these alternative scenarios are either very ineﬀective in smoothing the cycle or generate outcomes
very similar to one of our four main variants, so we do not report them in detail. In particular,
hikes in social security contributions paid by employees are isomorphic to appropriate increases in
the PIT rates as both are levied on labour income only. The results do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
if the government uses contributions levied on employers rather than employees. According to our
simulations, only enormous and completely unrealistic increases in capital income taxes would achieve
reductions in output volatility that come close to those obtained with the four policy instruments
considered above. We have also checked how our results change if the ﬁscal surplus generated by
the boom is used to permanently reduce the public debt. We have found no additional insights from
this kind of exercises.11
6 Evaluation of alternative policies
A natural question emerging from the simulations presented in the previous section is: which of
these policies achieves the best outcome? The answer depends on the criteria applied and these are
not straightforward to deﬁne, given that the model does not have all mechanisms that could make
the boom scenario harmful.
We have already used output volatility and welfare to choose between diﬀerent policy variants.
The relative performance of the policies along this ﬁrst dimension is summarised in the ﬁrst column of
Table 9. Obviously, if we assume that government purchases do not suﬀer from implementation lags
or commitment problems, appropriately designed spending cuts can eliminate output ﬂuctuations
completely and so this policy ranks ﬁrst. As regards other policies, their performance is far worse,
which is not surprising as we assumed that they cannot be adjusted on a quarterly basis. One-
oﬀ revaluation can at best reduce swings in GDP by nearly a third. Using the PIT rates as an
instrument decreases output volatility by about a quarter. Temporary VAT hikes and government
spending cuts, constrained in a similar way as the policies using tax rates, appear least attractive
(less than 20% reduction).
As we have already discussed, while targeting the output gap is a standard goal of stabilisation
policies, one can think of a number of other variables relevant to policy makers striving to prevent
accumulation of imbalances and overly optimistic expectations. The remaining columns of Table 9
oﬀer such a summary. Clearly, if the consumption boom is of concern, government spending cuts
signiﬁcantly lose in attractiveness. The VAT hike magniﬁes the boom in investment. The undesired
eﬀect of increases in the PIT rate are increased volatility of the real exchange rate and inﬂation.
The main weakness of the revaluation is high volatility of the real exchange rate. Still, this is the
only policy that cools down the boom in both private demand components and weakens the cost
pressure.
The results of the second, welfare based approach are reported in Table 10. The exchange rate
revaluation clearly ranks ﬁrst, with a steady state consumption equivalent nearly ﬁve times larger
11The results would change more if we assumed that the ﬁscal consolidation leads to an increase in the long run
net foreign assets position (Faruqee et al., 2007; Coenen et al., 2008a). This would essentially undo some (though less
than 20%, using the parametrisation from the literature) of our baseline impulse.20
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than the VAT hike. Interestingly, both policy variants imply some redistribution of welfare between
the two types of households, favouring non-Ricardian consumers. The reason is that this type of
households has a very limited ability to smooth their consumption (they can only adjust money
holdings) and countercyclical policies make their lack of access to asset markets less painful. Since
the policies relying on changes in the PIT rate or government spending do not call for any signiﬁcant
adjustment, their welfare implications are negligible.
Finally, it should be noted that the considered policy variants are not equally implementable.
It is diﬃcult to imagine the government of an accession country raising personal income taxes by
more than 10 percentage points. VAT hikes of the order suggested by our analysis would also be
diﬃcult to implement. The required magnitude of ﬁscal contraction does not look unreasonable, but
would certainly also face political constraints. Given the size of historical swings in the Polish zloty
and Slovakia’s experience in the ERM-II system,12 the exchange rate revaluation of 7% is by far
the least problematic option. Overall, since this policy also performs relatively well along the other
dimensions, we consider it the most promising.
7 Robustness check
Consistently with the literature discussed in the introduction, the driving force of our baseline scena-
rio is a decrease in an acceding country’s interest rates. However, there may be also other mechanisms
explaining the boom-bust cycles observed during the euro adoption. We have already mentioned one
of them, related to overly optimistic expectations. For instance, if agents in a catching-up economy
expected that entering the eurozone would signiﬁcantly speed up real convergence, this could result
in a boom. This boom is bound to turn into bust if these expectations fail to materialize.
We consider such a scenario in this section, drawing on simulations described in Kolasa (2010).
We associate the euro adoption with a positive but false news shock. More speciﬁcally, agents believe
that two years after accession productivity in the tradable sector will start converging to a level that
is 10% higher than under the baseline. The speed of convergence, i.e. the share of the remaining
gap that is eliminated every period, is set to 5%.13 After two years, however, productivity does not
take oﬀ, which pricks the bubble and brings the expectations back to their pre-accession level.
The dynamic responses to this scenario are plotted in Figure 11. A favourable news shock drives
private demand and output up, the current account deteriorates and inﬂation pressure translates
into depreciation of the real exchange rate. Once it becomes clear that the news was false, agents’
plans get revised, turning the boom into a sharp contraction.
There are at least two features of this scenario that make it less appealing as a candidate for
replicating a typical euro-related boom-bust episode. First, the magnitude of the boom is small
given the stylized facts discussed before, even though the calibrated scale of the news shock cannot
be considered low. Second, in contrast to convergence in nominal interest rates observed prior
to euro adoption, they barely move under the overly optimistic expectations scenario. This leads
12The Slovak koruna was revalued twice while in the ERM-II mechanism: by 8.5% in March 2007 and by 17.65%
in May 2008.
13Parametrization of our scenario is based on Daras and Hagemejer (2009), who estimate the long-run eﬀect of the
euro adoption on Poland’s GDP at 7.5% (which is consistent with an increase in tradable sector productivity by 10%),
of which around 90% is realized in the ﬁrst 10 years (consistently with our calibration of the speed of convergence at
5% quarterly).21
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us to a conclusion that this variant is not a fully convincing alternative to our baseline. Still,
as the mechanisms it describes may intensify in a catching-up economy entering the euro area, an
investigation of its impact on the desired policy responses certainly warrants attention. Nevertheless,
given its weakness as an alternative, this scenario should be rather thought of as complementary to
our main simulations.
To this eﬀect, we repeat the search for optimal policy interventions to the overly optimistic
expectations scenario. The results are summarized in Table 11. Both our evaluation criteria suggest
that some exchange rate revaluation is desired. In contrast to our baseline case, however, the
eﬀectiveness of this policy is low: output gap volatility is only marginally reduced and welfare gains
are very small. This is because the eﬀects of revaluation are spread over time, which means that
it can smooth the (relatively short-lived) boom only at the expense of making the following bust
deeper. For a similar reason, one can achieve little in terms of output gap volatility reduction by
changing the PIT rates, even though such an intervention cuts out relatively well if the welfare
criterion is applied. Interestingly, in the case of this policy a decrease rather than an increase in the
tax burden is recommended. Smoothing the output boom with a hike in VAT rates is somewhat more
successful. However, the implied welfare gains are as small as in the case of revaluation. Finally,
while adjusting government spending looks attractive as a policy reducing swings in output, this
action is not recommended by the welfare criterion. Overall, when we simultaneously apply both of
our evaluation criteria, neither of the interventions considered are eﬃcient in smoothing a boom-bust
cycle generated by overly optimistic expectations.
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, this scenario cannot be considered a standalone boom-bust
generator, but rather an addition to our main scenario. In this respect one should note that, with the
exception of a change in PIT rates, the recommendations presented above are broadly in line with
those from our baseline. In particular, they make the case for revaluation and a VAT hike. If the
credibility shift and overly optimistic expectations scenarios are merged, the eﬀects of an increase
in VAT are somewhat closer to those of revaluation, but the latter still ranks ﬁrst according to both
optimality criteria. Needless to say, while the implied joint size of revaluation (8-8.5%) still looks
acceptable from a political perspective, increasing the VAT rates by another 3 pp. over what is
implied by our baseline is even more diﬃcult to imagine. All in all, the presented robustness check
does not change our main conclusion of the attractiveness of revaluation.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate whether boom-bust episodes that have plagued several catching-up
economies during their euro-area accession (or pegging to the euro) can be avoided by an appropriate
use of macroeconomic policy tools. The boom-bust cycles are a result of sharply declining interest
rates in the period shortly preceding the euro area accession. Lower interest rates boost domestic
demand, output and imports. Over time this brings about higher inﬂation and deterioration in
competitiveness. As a result, domestic demand as well as exports decline and the boom turns into
bust. This process can lead to unwelcome developments that are hard to model, but emerge in real
life: overly optimistic expectations creating lending booms (and possible related problems in the
banking sector) as well as asset price bubbles.22
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To analyse the ability of monetary and ﬁscal authorities to smooth the boom, we use EAGLE, a
four country model developed by Gomes et al. (2010). The model is changed in three areas in order
to ﬁt our needs. First, we calibrate the model to include Poland - one of the potential victims of the
boom-bust scenario. The second adjustment is related to a speciﬁc feature of the Polish economy - a
relatively high import content of its exports (45%). Since in the original version of EAGLE exports
are produced only domestically, we reconstruct the model so that it now reﬂects a foreign input into
the production of export goods. Third, in order to perform meaningful welfare comparisons across
alternative ﬁscal policies, we incorporate public goods into households’ utility function.
Having done this, we ﬁrst generate the boom-bust scenario. A credibility shift, consisting of
a lower accepted net foreign asset position and the resulting decline of interest rates generates a
temporary boom that resembles the episodes described above. Next, we analyse the impact of four
policies (exchange rate revaluation, PIT increase, VAT increase and ﬁscal contraction) designed to
cool down the boom.
We ﬁnd that all considered policies are able to substantially smooth the boom in output. However,
they have diﬀerentiated eﬀects on other macro variables, some of them being undesired. For example,
ﬁscal contraction fuels the consumption boom, and a higher PIT rate increases inﬂation. From this
point of view, the exchange rate revaluation cuts oﬀ relatively well, cooling down the output and
inﬂation boom and substantially limiting booms in consumption and investment. Of course, this
comes at a cost of somewhat increased volatility of exports.
Revaluation is also the preferred policy according to the welfare criterion. Importantly, its
optimal magnitude coincides with that minimizing volatility of the output gap. This is in contrast
to the other policies, for which the welfare analysis suggests a signiﬁcantly lower size of intervention
than that implied by the output gap criterion, or even no action at all.
Looking at the instrument adjustment minimizing output gap volatility, we ﬁnd that the optimal
revaluation would amount to ca. 7%, VAT rate would be raised by 9 percentage points, the PIT
rate by 12 percentage points and the optimal ﬁscal contraction would amount to 2% of GDP. Thus,
from the political perspective, the analysed tax policies seem impossible to implement. On the
other hand, both the exchange rate revaluation and ﬁscal contraction seem to be of reasonable
magnitudes. All these considerations put together strongly suggest that the revaluation would be
the most promising tool in smoothing out the boom-bust cycle. This conclusion still holds when
we allow for the fact that the boom-bust episodes observed in catching-up economies during their
euro accession may additionally reﬂect a build-up of overly optimistic expectations about the real
convergence processes.
One should keep in mind that all policies considered in this paper have been designed to trim a
boom-bust cycle in domestic demand. They should not be expected to prevent asset price bubbles,
if these are going to emerge after euro area accession. This important and interesting problem would
require a diﬀerent approach and is left for further research.23
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Tables and ﬁgures
Table 1: Steady state ratios
PL EA US RW
GDP share in world GDP 1.0 22.0 28.0 49.0
Consumption share in GDP 61.3 58.1 66.6 58.3
Government expenditures share in GDP 17.4 20.5 14.7 16.6
Investment share in GDP 21.2 21.4 18.7 25.1
Imported consumption goods share in GDP 11.3 8.2 7.7 3.6
Imported investment goods share in GDP 13.9 8.4 7.6 4.5
Table 2: International linkages
to \ from PL EA US RW
consumption goods
PL . 52.1 2.9 45.0
EA 4.4 . 7.8 87.8
US 0.2 14.7 . 85.1
RW 2.3 58.3 39.4 .
investment goods
PL . 51.2 3.7 45.1
EA 3.0 . 11.6 85.4
US 0.2 14.9 . 84.9
RW 1.0 47.0 52.0 .
intermediate goods
PL . 51.5 2.3 46.2
EA 3.4 . 6.0 90.7
US 0.2 11.7 . 88.1
RW 1.6 45.3 53.1 .
Note: the numbers refer to percentage shares of imports from column country to row country in total imports to row
country of consumption, investment or intermediate goods respectively.
Table 3: Final goods
PL EA US RW
Quasi-share of nontradables in ﬁnal consumption goods (%) 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0
Quasi-share of nontradables in ﬁnal investment goods (%) 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Quasi-share of imports in export good (%) 45.0 20.0 15.0 35.0
Quasi-share of imports in tradable consumption goods (%) 66.1 44.3 40.4 17.3
Quasi-share of imports in tradable investment goods (%) 90.9 56.1 60.4 23.0
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and imports
(production of consumption and investment goods) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and imports
(production of export good) 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Elasticity of substitution between imported goods 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.527
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Table 4: Intermediate goods
PL EA US RW
Capital share in nontradable production 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Capital share in tradable production 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Elasticity of substitution between intermediate nontradable varieties 3.0 3.0 4.3 4.3
Elasticity of substitution between intermediate tradable varieties 4.3 4.3 6.0 6.0
Elasticity of substitution between imported varieties 4.3 4.3 6.0 6.0
Calvo probability for goods sold domestically 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Calvo probability for exported goods 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Price indexation 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Table 5: Households
PL EA US RW
Share of non-Ricardian households 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Habit persistence 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7
Inverse of the elasticity of labour supply 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Elasticity of substitution between labour varieties 4.33 4.33 7.25 7.25
Calvo probability for wages 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Wage indexation 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Depreciation rate 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
Table 6: Fiscal and monetary authorities
PL EA US RW
Target government debt to quarterly GDP ratio 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
Response of lump sum taxes to deviation of public debt from target 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Consumption tax rate (%) 15.8 18.3 7.7 7.7
Personal income tax rate (%) 9.3 12.2 15.4 15.4
Social security contribution tax paid by employees (%) 11.9 21.9 7.1 7.1
Social security contribution tax paid by employers (%) 14.3 11.9 7.1 7.1
Interest rate smoothing 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Long-run response of interest rates to inﬂation 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70
Long-run response of interest rates to output growth 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
Table 7: Adjustment costs
PL EA US RW
Capacity utilisation cost 2000 2000 2000 2000
Investment adjustment cost 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Import adjustment cost for consumption goods 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Import adjustment cost for investment goods 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Import adjustment cost for intermediate goods 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
International transaction cost 0.0025 0.0025 . 0.002528
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Table 8: Permanent credibility shift - long run eﬀects
Variable Long-run eﬀect











Net foreign assets -30.00
Terms of trade 1.22
Real eﬀective exchange rate 1.60
Internal real exchange rate -1.00
EA output -0.01
EA consumption 0.11
Note: The trade balance and net foreign assets are expressed relative to nominal output.
All variables are reported as per cent or percentage point deviations from their initial steady state values.
Table 9: Volatility reduction of the main macrovariables - policies minimizing output ﬂuctuations
Output Consump. Investment Cur. acc. Real ER Inﬂation
Revaluation (7%) 31.0 13.9 11.8 1.6 -36.2 14.2
VAT hike (9 pp, 2y) 17.6 14.1 -10.2 1.5 6.3 23.3
PIT hike (12 pp, 2y) 25.5 11.9 9.6 -2.1 -21.6 -38.6
Gov. exp. cuts (2% of GDP, 3y) 16.1 -6.4 -4.2 0.7 11.2 28.1
Gov. exp. cuts (full GDP stabil.) 100.0 -34.2 12.1 7.1 16.9 25.9
Note: Volatility reductions are relative to the baseline scenario and expressed in per cent. Inﬂation is measured as
CPI at producer prices.
Table 10: Welfare gains - policies maximizing households’ utility
Welfare gain, of which households:
Ricardian Non-Ricardian All
Revaluation (7%) -0.022 0.187 0.029
VAT hike (4.5 pp, 2y) -0.033 0.127 0.006
PIT hike (0 pp, 2y) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gov. exp. cuts (0% of GDP, 3y) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Welfare gains are deﬁned as the diﬀerence (in per cent of steady state consumption) between welfare under
the optimal response to the boom and welfare achieved by applying during the boom a policy that is optimal in
normal times. Aggregation of the two types of households uses their shares in population.29
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Table 11: False news scenario - evaluation of policies
Output volatility criterion Welfare criterion
Optimal size Vol. reduction Optimal size Welfare gain
Revaluation 1% 2.1 1.5% 0.001
VAT hike 3 pp, 1y 12.5 3 pp, 1y 0.001
PIT hike -2 pp, 2y 6.2 -7 pp, 2y 0.005
Gov. exp. cuts 1% of GDP, 2y 22.0 0% of GDP, 2y 0.000
Note: Output volatility reduction is relative to the baseline scenario and expressed in per cent. Welfare gains are
deﬁned as the diﬀerence (in per cent of steady state consumption) between welfare under the optimal response to
the boom and welfare achieved by applying during the boom a policy that is optimal in normal times. Aggregation
of the two types of households uses their shares in population.30
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1280
December 2010
Figure 1: Stylised facts for boom-bust cycles
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Note: The ﬁgures present unweighted averages of rich (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Ne-
therlands) and catching-up (Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lihuania, Portugal and Spain) euro area members and countries
with a hard peg against the euro. The plots are centred around the year (denoted as zero) of each country’s accession
or pegging (Estonia - 1999, Latvia - 2004, Lithuania - 2002). We drop the observations that were substantially aﬀected
by factors unrelated to these processes, e.g. the Russian crisis of 1998 and the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-09. These include
i.a. GDP and consumption growth rates in Estonia and Lithuania in 1999 and all data for Latvia in 2009. GDP and
consumption are presented as growth rates, while the current account balance and net foreign assets as percent of
GDP. The real eﬀective exchange rate is deﬂated using unit labour costs (EA accession or pegging year = 100, growth
denotes depreciation).
Source: Eurostat and IFS.31
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a technology shock
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Note: Solid line - peg, dashed line - independent monetary policy. Both responses for Poland. All values in per
cent deviations from steady state except inﬂation and interest rate, which are given in annualised percentage point
deviations.32
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
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Note: Solid line - peg, dashed line - independent monetary policy. Both responses for Poland. All values in per
cent deviations from steady state except inﬂation and interest rate, which are given in annualised percentage point
deviations.33
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a risk premium shock
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Note: Solid line - peg, dashed line - independent monetary policy. Both responses for Poland. All values in per
cent deviations from steady state except inﬂation and interest rate, which are given in annualised percentage point
deviations.34
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a government expenditure shock
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Note: Solid line - peg, dashed line - independent monetary policy. Both responses for Poland. All values in per
cent deviations from steady state except inﬂation and interest rate, which are given in annualised percentage point
deviations.35
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Figure 6: Credibility shift scenario (baseline)















































Real effective exchange rate

























Note: The ﬁscal surplus and current account balance are expressed relative to nominal output. Inﬂation and the
nominal interest rate are annualised. All variables are reported as per cent or percentage point deviations from their
initial steady state values.36
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Figure 7: Credibility shift scenario with exchange rate revaluation















































Real effective exchange rate























Note: Grey line - baseline scenario, black line - baseline with exchange rate revaluation by 7%. The ﬁscal surplus
and current account balance are expressed relative to nominal output. Inﬂation and the nominal interest rate are
annualised. All variables are reported as per cent or percentage point deviations from their initial steady state
values.37
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Figure 8: Credibility shift scenario with a 2-year VAT hike















































Real effective exchange rate

























Note: Grey line - baseline scenario, black solid line - baseline with VAT rate hike by 9 pp for 2 years, black dashed
line - baseline with VAT rate hike by 4.5 pp for 2 years. The ﬁscal surplus and current account balance are
expressed relative to nominal output. Inﬂation and the nominal interest rate are annualised. All variables are
reported as per cent or percentage point deviations from their initial steady state values.38
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Figure 9: Credibility shift scenario with a 2-year PIT hike
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Note: Grey line - baseline scenario, black solid line - baseline with PIT rate hike by 12 pp for 2 years, black dashed
line - baseline with PIT rate reduction by 0.08 pp for 2 years. The ﬁscal surplus and current account balance are
expressed relative to nominal output. Inﬂation and the nominal interest rate are annualised. All variables are
reported as per cent or percentage point deviations from their initial steady state values.39
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Figure 10: Credibility shift scenario with government spending cuts












































Real effective exchange rate

























Note: Grey line - baseline scenario, black solid line - baseline with ﬁscal contraction by 2% of GDP for 3 years, black
dashed line - baseline with ﬁscal contraction by 0.04% of GDP for 3 years, black dotted line - baseline with
government spending adjustments that fully stabilize output. The ﬁscal surplus and current account balance are
expressed relative to nominal output. Inﬂation and the nominal interest rate are annualised. All variables are
reported as per cent or percentage point deviations from their initial steady state values.40
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Figure 11: Overly optimistic expectations scenario
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Note: The ﬁscal surplus and current account balance are expressed relative to nominal output. Inﬂation and the
nominal interest rate are annualised. All variables are reported as per cent or percentage point deviations from their
initial steady state values.41
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Appendix: Derivation of the import content of exports
This appendix documents the extension of EAGLE for a non-zero import content of exports. The
derivation draws from Coenen and Vetlov (2009). A new type of good - export good - is introduced,
which is used as input in the production of consumption, investment and export goods in other
countries. This derivation is to be read together with the original model description (Gomes et al.,
2010).
In what follows, the following indexing will be applied. For exports and their prices, index
CO1,CO2 denotes exports from country CO1 to country CO2. For imports and their prices, index
CO1,CO2 denotes imports by country CO1 from country CO2. When no index is given, the home
economy H is meant.
The export good
The export good is produced by an inﬁnite number of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms h of measure
sH. The production process is completed in two stages. First, capital and labour are combined to
produce a domestic tradable good. Next, this good is combined with an imported good, being itself
an aggregate of export goods from all trading partners. The export good is priced to the export
market subject to nominal price rigidities.
Production of the export good
















where μX is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods
and νX is the home bias parameter in the production of export goods (1−νX is the import content
of exports).
The domestic input into the export good HTX
t (h) consists of intermediate tradable goods Y S
T,t(h),










t (h) and ND
t (h) are inputs of capital and labour bundles, zT is a productivity shock in
the tradables sector and ψT represents a ﬁxed production cost.







































IMX denotes the share of IMX
t imported from CO in total imports of IMX
t by H. This













































































where the last term is the derivative of Γ
H,CO




Following (1), the cost of producing export goods depends on the cost of home tradables and imports.






t (h) subject to the production function (2):
MCT,t =
(RK
t )αT((1 + τ
Wf
t )Wt)1−αT
zT,t(αT)αT(1 − αT)1−αT (8)
where RK
t is the rental cost of capital and (1 + τ
Wf
t )Wt is the wage augmented by the labour
tax.
Derivation of the marginal cost of exported goods involves minimising the cost of inputs
MCT,tHTX
t (h)+PIMX,tIMX
t (h) subject to (1). This yields the following demand functions for
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IMX






Where MCX,t is the marginal cost of producing the export good:
MCX,t =
 






Pricing of the export good
Export good producers discriminate between export markets. Given marginal cost they set the price
subject to the demand function14 for exports to country CO. Price setting is subject to nominal
rigidities of the Calvo type. Every period 1 − ξX ﬁrms are allowed to change their price - for the
export market CO they choose the price ˜ P
H,CO










X,t−1 denotes the inﬂation rate in the export sector,¯ Π is the inﬂation target of the central
bank and χX is the indexation parameter.
Each ﬁrm that reoptimises its price at period t maximises the discounted sum of its expected
nominal proﬁts expressed in domestic currency:
14The basket IM
X,CO
t (h)o fi m p o r t st oc o u n t r yCO from H (demanded by the foreign company hCO) is constructed






















t (h,x) denotes the use of export goods produced by company h used by importer hCO. Given the
price of home tradable goods, minimisation of expenditure for the bundle
´ sH
0 PX,t(h)IMX
t (h,hCO)dh results in the






























































































t is the nominal exchange rate between countries H and CO. The ﬁrst order condition
























The resulting price index of export goods exported from country H to country CO is a geometric























This section describes closing conditions that are changed as compared to EAGLE. For brevity, the
reader is referred to Gomes et al. (2010) for deﬁnitions and derivations of several newly introduced
variables.
Market clearing in the home tradable sector



















































































where the derivation uses (9) and (16). Moreover, sHT,t is the measure of dispersion of prices
of home tradables, HTC
t (h) and HTI
t (h) are home tradable goods used in the production of ﬁnal45
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consumptions and investment goods respectively, Pt(h) is the price of the tradable good produced
by ﬁrm h and sold on the domestic market and PHT,t is the aggregate price of these goods. Details













=( 1 − ξX)



















is the measure of dispersion of prices charged for exports to market CO.
Aggregation in the import sector

























IM are variables related import adjustment costs. Again, these variables are
precisely described in Gomes et al. (2010).































Dividends in the tradable sector






























where DH,t(h)a n dDX,t(h) denote proﬁts made by ﬁrm h by producing for the domestic and
export market, respectively.Working PaPer SerieS
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